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This paper provides updated estimates of the impact of three financial frictions – negative equity, mortgage
lock-in, and property tax lock-in – on household mobility.  We add the 2009 wave of the American
Housing Survey (AHS) to our sample and also create an improved measure of permanent moves in
response to Schulhofer-Wohl’s (2011) critique of our earlier work (Ferreira, Gyourko and Tracy (2010)).
Our updated estimates corroborate our previous results: negative equity reduces household mobility
by 30 percent, and $1,000 of additional mortgage or property tax costs reduces household mobility
by 10%-16%.  Schulhofer-Wohl’s finding of a slight positive correlation between mobility and negative
equity appears due to a large fraction of false positives, as his coding methodology has the propensity
to misclassify almost half of the additional moves it identifies relative to our measure of permanent
moves.  This also makes his mobility measure dynamically inconsistent, as many transitions originally
classified as a move are reclassified as a non-move when additional AHS panels become available.
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I.  Introduction 
  A long literature in housing economics has noted that a rise in mortgage rates could 
‘lock-in’ an owner to her current house, thereby slowing or preventing a permanent move to a 
new residence if mortgage interest rates had risen sufficiently to make the new debt service 
payment unaffordable (Quigley (1987, 2002)).  Other financial frictions, such as the one arising 
from California’s Proposition 13 property tax rules, would have similar effects on household 
mobility (Ferreira (2010)).  Negative equity, by which we mean the current value of the house is 
less than the outstanding mortgage balance, also could reduce household mobility if the owner 
does not have enough liquidity to pay off the full loan balance, which is required for a permanent 
move and sale of the property if the borrower is to avoid the cost of a default (Stein (1995), Chan 
(2001), and Engelhardt (2003)). 
  These three potential financial frictions are all associated with the sale of the house so 
there is a transfer of economic ownership, not just a change of residence.  Thus, the type of 
household mobility that may be impacted by these financial frictions involves permanent moves 
in which both physical location and economic ownership changes for the previous owner.  The 
housing literature on financial frictions does not have clear implications for temporary moves in 
which the household leaves the house for a period of time – perhaps to rent out the house – and 
returns at a later date.  Overall mobility reflects both permanent and temporary moves.  The 
mobility measure of interest depends on the question being addressed.  Given our underlying 
research question, when we refer to mobility in this paper, we mean mobility arising from 
permanent moves. 
  Interest in the relationship between the mobility of homeowners and financial frictions, 
especially those associated with negative home equity, was piqued both for researchers and 2 
 
policy makers by the recent extraordinary boom and bust in U.S. housing markets.  Because the 
studies cited above were dated or based on samples from specific geographic regions or 
population subgroups, we used the American Housing Survey (AHS) panel from 1985-2007 to 
provide new and more general estimates for the nation (Ferreira, Gyourko and Tracy (2010);  
FGT (2010) hereafter) that include all three forms of financial frictions in the same econometric 
specification.  FGT’s (2010) three primary results were as follows:  (a) owners with negative 
equity were one-third less likely to move than otherwise observationally equivalent owners 
without negative equity; (b) for every $1,000 in higher mortgage debt service costs, mobility was 
about 12% lower; c) similar increases in property tax costs from Proposition 13 in California also 
reduced mobility by about 12%. 
  This note updates our previous work in two important ways.  It adds data from the most 
recent 2009 AHS survey, providing the first evidence from the beginning of the bust in home 
prices in many markets.  Second, we address Schulhofer-Wohl’s (2011) criticism of our sample 
selection procedures, which he claimed underreported mobility and were responsible for our 
reported negative correlation of mobility with negative equity.   
Schulhofer-Wohl (2011) is correct that we underreported overall mobility.  However, that 
was done by design in order to distinguish between permanent and temporary moves.  This is 
crucial for our research question, as the underlying theory from earlier work implies that it is 
only with respect to permanent moves that these potential financial frictions should lead to lower 
mobility.  A temporary move reflects a situation in which an owner-occupied residence is 
reported as vacant or rented for one or more surveys, with the original owner subsequently 
returning to the residence.  These can occur because of a homeowner really vacates her home 
temporarily or because vacancy status is misreported in the AHS survey data.  Economic 3 
 
ownership does not change in this latter case so the costs associated with the frictions have not 
yet been incurred.  Nevertheless, Schulhofer-Wohl’s (2011) critique led us to develop an 
improved measure that better exploits the panel structure of the AHS to distinguish between the 
two types of moves.  This raises our reported mobility rates substantially (by over 25%), but it 
does not materially affect our findings from FGT (2010), as reported below in Section III. 
In that analysis, we do not adopt Schulhofer-Wohl’s (2011) strategy of counting all 
transitions from ownership to rental or vacancy status as permanent moves because it 
dramatically overstates their number.  His finding of a slight positive correlation between 
homeowner mobility and negative equity is likely due largely to conflating temporary and 
permanent moves.
2  We show below that over the period from 1985 to 1999 in the AHS data, 
more than 20% of his moves are temporary in nature, which makes his measure problematic for 
use in research about lock-in effects.  These temporary moves correspond to approximately 50% 
of the additional moves that Schulhofer-Wohl (2011) tallied in excess of our new, preferred 
mobility measure.  There is still uncertainty about the economic ownership of the property for 
the other 50% of additional moves.   
Schulhofer-Wohl’s (2011) measure of mobility also can be dynamically inconsistent, 
with moves in one period recoded at a later date as non-moves as additional waves of AHS data 
are included in the estimation sample.  These issues are especially worrisome if one is trying to 
understand the impact of the recent housing bust on household mobility because the errors from 
conflating temporary and permanent moves are concentrated near the end of the data, and the 
                                                 
2 Schulhofer-Wohl used FGT (2010) data and codes to generate his mobility measure, and compared his results with 
our baseline measure of mobility.  He then provided his underlying code, just as we did for him.  Our discussion of 
his mobility measure always applies to the first of four such variables from his 2011 paper. 4 
 
AHS does not yet have enough post crisis surveys to allow researchers to distinguish between 
these types of moves.
3   
This update highlights how noisy are the data from AHS surveys, but we know of no 
superior source with which to investigate this issue.  Given that it takes time to resolve 
uncertainty about whether some transitions are permanent or temporary in nature, there is no 
variable that perfectly reflects the mobility relevant to analysis of the impact of financial 
frictions.  That includes our improved measure reported in this paper.  It still understates true 
mobility rates to the extent any of the moves that we censor due to uncertainty about whether a 
change in economic ownership of the property occurred actually reflect permanent moves.  
Precisely where to draw the line on this measurement issue requires careful consideration of the 
costs and benefits of overstating versus understating the amount of permanent moves.  We 
continue to advocate for a conservative coding strategy which is dynamically consistent over 
time, but this clearly is not costless. 
  Beyond doing everything possible to reduce the noise in the data, future research should 
address the issue of the extent to which these correlations represent a causal relationship.  As we 
noted in our previous work, the likelihood that labor markets deteriorate along with housing 
markets raises the possibility that owners with negative equity are not moving in part because 
there are no good job opportunities elsewhere for them.  Distinguishing between these two 
potential causes of reduced mobility requires expanding one’s theoretical and empirical horizons 
to better control for labor market conditions, and that is the direction in which we urge future 
research on this topic to turn.  
 
                                                 
3 The distinction between permanent and temporary moves will also be a data issue for researchers using household 
panel data sets such as the Panel Survey on Income Dynamics (PSID).  Exact property address information will be 
required to reliably distinguish between these two types of moves. 5 
 
II.  Additional Data and New Measures of Mobility 
II.A. Changes in the data and summary statistics 
There are four changes to the data used in this update of FGT (2010).  The first is the 
addition of the 2009 AHS sample, which became available after we had published our previous 
article.  The 2009 AHS data allow researchers to begin to examine the impact of the house price 
declines between 2005 and 2007 on household mobility from 2007 to 2009.  This is 
straightforward, and we present and compare results with and without the new data.  This does 
not result in any meaningful changes in our findings.
4 
The second change involves the use of First American-Core Logic (FACL) repeat-sales 
price indexes in lieu of the Federal Housing Finance Administration (FHFA) series when we 
create instruments to address measurement error in the creation of negative equity variables.  
Unlike the FHFA series which are based only on conforming loans, the FACL series include 
arms-length purchases made with conforming and non-conforming loans, including subprime, 
Alt-A and jumbo mortgages.  We believe this provides a more complete picture of what was 
going on in terms of local house prices especially in recent years, but this change also has no 
material impact on the results.
5 
The third change involves additional cleaning of the panel structure of the AHS data.  The 
AHS survey was designed to be primarily used as a series of cross-sections rather than as a panel.  
For this reason, a variable that we employ to define the panel structure – the purchase year of the 
house -- was not dependent coded.  By that, we mean that the interviewer does not have access to 
the responses for this variable from prior surveys, so that there is no way to ensure consistent 
                                                 
4 We caution below that this does not necessarily signal that the estimated relationship between mobility and 
negative equity during this housing market downturn will not change as additional AHS survey data becomes 
available.  See the discussion below for more on this. 
5 The FACL used here includes the impact of distressed transactions. We have experimented with a series that does 
not include them, and it does not change our results. 6 
 
coding across surveys at the time of the interview.  As a result, the purchase year can vary in the 
data even for the same household.  If left uncorrected, this spurious variation in the reported 
purchase year will induce false household transitions.  FGT (2010) developed several rules that 
were used to identify and clean these false household transitions in the data.  For this update, we 
also include hard-coded edits to the purchase year based on an inspection of the data history for 
each residence, including information on the household head’s demographic characteristics.  
This additional cleaning of the panel structure significantly improves on our earlier rule-based 
edits.
6  
The fourth and most important change involves the use of an improved measure of 
mobility, which is the dependent variable in our analysis.  This alteration was motivated by 
Schulhofer-Wohl’s (2011) critique of our sample selection procedures.  In FGT (2010), we 
deliberately chose a conservative definition of what constituted a move for the reason noted 
above—namely, that theory suggests financial frictions involving the likes of negative equity or 
mortgage lock-in should impact mobility for permanent moves.  To ensure we did not mistakenly 
include temporary moves (or false transitions due to any remaining reporting error in the survey), 
we restricted our sample to those observations where it was immediately clear either that the 
same household resided in the given housing unit across consecutive surveys (in which case 
there was not a move) or that a different household lived in and owned the unit that had been 
owned by another household in the previous survey (in which case there was a permanent move 
because both physical location and economic ownership had changed).   
Summary statistics of our original mobility variable, here called MOVE, are reported in 
the first row of Table 1.  This measure is identical to the one used in FGT (2010).  Focusing 
                                                 
6 In the current work, we also follow Schulhofer-Wohl (2011) in setting tenure to missing whenever tenure was 
imputed by the AHS.  There were 2,183 cases where the reported imputed tenure was reported as owner-occupied 
and 458 cases reported as rental. 7 
 
initially on the top panel which reports data for the 1985-2007 period covered in FGT (2010) 
shows that 7.8% of the 61,801 housing transitions used in our regression analysis are moves 
according to this definition.
7  Those 61,801 transitions are only 82.7% of the total number of 
observations potentially available to us.
8  That is, we treat 17.3% of the potential transitions as 
censored. In 2.4% of the cases, the move is censored due to the observation being the last in the 
panel of data for a particular residence.  The remaining cases involve transitions of the property 
from ownership to rental or from ownership to vacancy where it is still possible that we may 
observe the original owner return to the property. 
In his first and preferred mobility measure, Schulhofer-Wohl (2011) effectively counted 
all cases in which a unit that had been owned in a given survey and was now being rented or was 
vacant in the subsequent survey as a move.  Using the code Schulhofer-Wohl provided, we 
created this variable in our data.  It is labeled MOVE-SW in the second row of Table 1.  Note the 
much higher mobility given this definition—16.4% of transitions are moves, versus 7.8% given 
FGT (2010)’s definition.
9  A much lower fraction of the data is censored using the MOVE-SW 
                                                 
7 The reported mobility rate drops from 11.4% in our previous work to 7.8% in this new estimation sample. This 
decline  reflects the removal of false moves as a result of the additional data cleaning. 
8There are 74,774 observations on potential transitions between 1985 and 2007 for which we have complete data on 
all of the control variables as well as instruments used in our regression specification reported below.  The 
estimation sample of 61,801 is nearly identical to our earlier estimation sample size of 61,803. This reflects the fact 
that the additional observations added to the estimation sample due to cleaning of previously uncaught false 
transitions in the panel structure nearly balance the number of observations lost due to deleting observations with 
imputed tenure status. 
9 As we will show later, the MOVE-SW measure would reflect even higher mobility if it literally did what 
Schulhofer-Wohl states in his paper (2011, p. 5):  “As I explain in the introduction, FGT drop from the sample all 
cases where a house is owner-occupied in year t but is vacant or rented in year t+2.  I make only one change to 
FGT’s data:  I code those cases as moves.”  FGT (2010) does not actually censor all such cases.  For example, if the 
existing owner were to temporarily leave the unit vacant or rent it out and then come back to the unit in a subsequent 
survey, the data set for our 2010 paper would not censor the initial observation in that sequence.  Our code would 
recognize that the initial observation in that sequence was not the last for the given household, and we only allow 
moves for the last observation on the household.  By using the code from our 2010 paper, Schulhofer-Wohl (2011) 
effectively corrects for some temporary moves like this, so that not every case in which a ‘house is owner-occupied 
in year t but is vacant or rented in year t+2’ is counted as a move in his data.  We comment more on this below. 8 
 
measure, reflecting only the 2.4% of cases noted earlier where the observation is the final one in 
the data panel for a particular residence. 
 
II.B. Two new measures of mobility that exploit the AHS panel structure 
Because the conservative coding approach in FGT (2010) could result in dropping some 
permanent moves in a non-random way that might affect our key estimates, we develop an 
improved measure of mobility that uses the AHS panel structure to help mitigate this potential 
problem.  This new variable is labeled MOVE1 in Table 1.  In creating it, for all cases where the 
next survey indicates that the house is vacant or rented, we now look forward across all available 
surveys to see if the house again becomes owner-occupied by another household, not just the 
previous owner.  If it does, we note the year in which the house was purchased.  If the purchase 
year is between the current survey year and the next survey, we code this as a permanent move. 
An example is illustrated below.  The top row reports the AHS survey year; the second 
row indicates tenure status (owned or rented);  and the third row reports the year the home was 
purchased by its owner. 
 
Survey  year  2003 2005 2007 2009 
Tenure status  Own  Rent Rent Own 
Year  purchased  1997 NA  NA 2004 
 
In this case, the housing unit was owned as of 2003 by someone who purchased it in 1997.  The 
same housing unit is reported as rented in the next two surveys.  Then, the 2009 survey reports 
the unit as again being owned, with the owner having purchased the home in 2004.  This tells us 
there was a permanent move by our prior owner, with the house being sold to a new owner in 
2004 and that owner presumably renting it out for a period of time.  In our previous coding, 
situations like this would have resulted in a censored value for our dependent variable in 2003, 9 
 
with the observation being dropped from the analysis. Our new mobility measure MOVE1 will 
code this as a move for the 2003 observation.     
We also take advantage of a variable in the AHS that records the vacancy status of a unit 
(“vacancy”) to help resolve some of the cases that are censored under the rules creating the 
MOVE mobility indicator.  For example, we code MOVE1 as indicating that a move and sale 
took place if the vacancy variable indicates that the house has been “sold but not yet occupied” 
(vacancy = 5).  We code MOVE1 to indicate that the original owner has not moved if the unit is 
listed as being held for occasional use, seasonal use, or usual residence elsewhere (vacancy = 6-
11).  Each of these instances suggests the presence of multiple homes for the household, so that 
one should not interpret a transition as a permanent move and sale of the property.  We also code 
MOVE1 to indicate that the unit has not sold if the unit is listed as non-cash rent for one or more 
surveys followed by owner-occupied status with the purchase year outside of the window 
between survey years. Finally, we code MOVE1 to indicate that a move and sale has not taken 
place if the unit is vacant for two consecutive surveys and listed as sold but not occupied in the 
second survey (vacancy(t+2) = 5). 
Table 1 shows that resolving previously censored cases in this manner results in 10.0% of 
our regression sample transitions now being coded as permanent moves.  MOVE1 mobility is 
much higher than MOVE (by 28%), but it remains well below that for MOVE-SW.  We will 
discuss the differences across measures more fully just below, but before we do, we introduce 
another mobility variable called MOVE2. 
For MOVE2, we maintain the requirement that we are certain that the household has 
permanently moved, but relax the restriction that we know that the house sold in the interval 10 
 
between the relevant surveys.  Naturally, this leads to an even higher fraction of transitions being 
classified as permanent moves, as indicated in the following example.   
 
Survey  year  2003 2005 2007 2009 
Tenure status  Own  Rent Rent Own 
Year  purchased  1997 NA  NA 2008 
Move1  Censored NA  NA   
Move2  Yes NA NA   
 
In this case, we cannot tell if the owner in 2003 both changed residence and sold the property 
between 2003 and 2005.  It is possible that a move and sale did take place and that the new 
owner decided to rent out the property until 2008 when the property was re-sold.  That new 
owner then decides to live in the property and reports a purchase year of 2008 in the 2009 AHS.  
On the other hand, it is also possible that the owner in 2003 decides to move and to rent out the 
property, becoming an absentee landlord.  The house is then sold in 2008.  Since both situations 
are consistent with the reported data, this would result in MOVE1 being censored and recorded 
as missing.  However, in MOVE2 we classify this as a move in 2003 because we know that the 
original owner moved and did not return to the property.  Thus, MOVE2 includes cases in which 
we know there was a permanent move, but cannot resolve the timing of the sale by the original 
owner.  The last row of the top panel of Table 1 shows that the fraction of MOVE2 transitions is 
ten percent higher than for MOVE1 (11.0% versus 10.0%).  Still, this more expansive definition 
does not generate anything close to the level of mobility indicated by MOVE-SW. 
The bottom panel of Table 1 reports the analogous data for each mobility measure for the 
full sample that includes the 2009 survey data.  Note that mobility is lower for each variable, 
which indicates that measured mobility declined between the 2007 and 2009 surveys.  We 
exploit this issue in more detail below. 
 11 
 
II.C. Trade-offs across different measures of mobility 
Our worry about Schulhofer-Wohl’s empirical strategy for the question that we are 
addressing is that several of the housing transitions that he considers as moves are false positives 
in the sense they are temporary moves or reflect coding error in the underlying survey.  To gauge 
how serious is the potential problem of conflating these types of moves, we evaluated the 
likelihood of Type I and Type II coding errors on his mobility measure by coding them in ‘real 
time’ in the AHS data.  That is, we begin by reading in the cleaned panel and selecting 
observations for 1985 and 1987.  We then code MOVE-SW based on his code for 1985 using 
data from both the 1985 and 1987 surveys.  These values for MOVE-SW are saved and the 
exercise is repeated using the 1987 and 1989 pair of surveys, the 1989-1991 pair, and so on, until 
1997-1999.  We stop in 1999 for this exercise to ensure that we have enough future surveys to 
assess whether Schulhofer-Wohl’s moves turned out to be permanent or temporary.  We call this 
real-time version of the Schulhofer-Wohl mobility measure MOVE-SW
R. 
It is important to note that the coding of MOVE-SW
R in this real-time analysis differs 
from the coding of MOVE-SW used in the estimation sample.  The example below illustrates 
why. 
 
Survey  year  2003 2005 2007 
Tenure status  Own  Rent  Own 
Year purchased  1997  NA  1997 
 
When the 2003 AHS data is added to the estimation sample, MOVE (and our two other mobility 
measures), MOVE-SW and MOVE-SW
R for 2003 will all be censored because at that time, this 
is the last observation in the panel for the residence.  When the 2005 AHS data is added, MOVE 
for 2003 will remain censored and both MOVE-SW and MOVE-SW
R for 2003 will be recoded 
as a move.  However, when the 2007 AHS data is merged into the sample, MOVE for 2003 (as 12 
 
well as MOVE1 and MOVE2) will be recoded from censored to a non-move, while MOVE-SW 
for 2003 will be recoded from a move to a non-move, and MOVE-SW
R for 2003 will remain 
coded as a move (since we do not allow the real-time measure to be recoded once it indicates that 
a move has taken place).  The reason for the recoding of MOVE and MOVE-SW is that in 
constructing these mobility measures the data are sorted by residence, household (based on a 
unique household identification number we create), and survey year.  Using the sorted data, a 
move is only considered for the last observation for that household.  As a result, our coding 
strategy for MOVE (as well as MOVE1 and MOVE2) only recodes censored observations as 
either non-moves or moves, and never recodes non-censored mobility observations.  In contrast, 
the coding for MOVE-SW can be dynamically inconsistent over time, with moves recoded at a 
later date as non-moves. By construction, MOVE-SW
R maintains dynamic consistency by not 
recoding a move as a non-move even when information becomes available indicating that the 
original owner has returned. 
The top panel of Table 2 reports cross-tabulations of our MOVE2 indicator, which takes 
full advantage of the panel to differentiate between permanent and temporary transitions, and 
MOVE-SW
R.
10  We use MOVE2 for this analysis since our focus here is whether a move is 
permanent or not regardless of when the property was sold.  The first column documents that 
these two mobility variables agree that there were 70,707 cases in which there was no move.  
There are no cases in which our MOVE2 measure considered some transition a move when 
MOVE-SW
R did not (that is, there is no evidence of Type II errors); nor is MOVE2 ever 
censored or missing when MOVE-SW
R indicates that no move took place. 
                                                 
10 Here we use all available transitions from the AHS for owner-occupied residents between 21 and 59 years of age 
over the period from 1985 to 1999 and do not restrict the observations to those with non-missing values for all of the 
regressors that we use in the final mobility estimation. 13 
 
The second column is more interesting because both mobility measures have 8,550 
moves, but MOVE-SW
R has an additional 8,607 moves.  Moreover, 41.3% (= 3,557 / 8,607) of 
the additional moves in MOVE-SW
R turn out to be temporary in nature in that they reflect Type 
I errors.  That is, using the full panel of surveys up to 2009, we observe the owner return to the 
unit at some point in the future, or they reflect some other trait that leads us to conclude there has 
not been a permanent move.
11 
Out of all false positives from MOVE-SW
R, in two-thirds of the cases the Type I error 
could be eliminated by looking at only one subsequent AHS survey, as shown in the bottom 
panel of Table 2.  To better understand this, presume that we are uncertain about whether a 
transition in the 1985 data is permanent or temporary.  That is, the data are clear that there was a 
given owner-occupant in 1985, but a different occupant or reported vacancy in 1987.  In 66% of 
the cases, the 1989 survey fully resolves the uncertainty.  In these “false positive” cases, that 
means we see the same household living and owning the same housing unit in both 1985 and 
1989.  Another 17.4% of the false positives are resolved by the next available survey (i.e., after 
six years have passed), so that over 83% of the cases are clarified by 1991 in this example.  The 
remaining cases are all clarified with future surveys, with some owners being absent for long 
periods of time.  However, the number of those cases is quite small.
12 
It is also important to note that for 5,050 transitions, MOVE2 is assigned a censored 
value, while MOVE-SW
R considers them moves.  While none of these cases can be definitively 
                                                 
11 As noted above, the lack of dependent coding for this variable means that some of these cases could be due to 
coding error by the AHS survey taker in the sense she does see or interview the original owner and mistakenly 
concludes the unit is not occupied by the same person.  The most important of the latter type of factor involves units 
that are described as being vacant and held for occasional or seasonal use.  This group comprises 14% of the 3,557 
cases.  There is a much smaller fraction (1.2%) for which there is non-cash rent and a subsequent sale outside the 
relevant sample interval.  There is an even smaller number (0.3%) that are vacant across two consecutive surveys, 
with the second survey listing the housing unit as sold, but not yet occupied. 
12 Subsequent to a temporary move, the mean (median) duration by the owner in the residence is 6.1 (5.0) years. In 
38 percent of the cases, the post-temporary move duration is censored by the end of the data in 2009. 14 
 
identified as permanent moves with the currently available data, some of them undoubtedly are 
and will be revealed and coded as such over time as additional survey data becomes available.  In 
practice, this means MOVE2 still does not include all true permanent moves.  This highlights 
that there is no perfect measure of such mobility as long as the data do not allow for the 
immediate recognition of whether an economic change in ownership has occurred. 
 
III.  Results 
III.A. Estimation Methodology 
As discussed in FGT (2010), given the likely measurement error in our measures of the 
three financial frictions, we want to be able to instrument for this measurement error to reduce 
the attenuation bias.  While our alternative measures for these three frictions are also subject to 
measurement error, if the sources of these errors are uncorrelated, then we can use them as 
instruments.  To accommodate our data structure, we use a recursive mixed-process model that 
expands upon the classic mobility specifications introduced by Hanushek and Quigley (1979) 
and Venti and Wise (1984) which also served as the foundation for our earlier empirical work.  
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where  mi I  is our observed mobility indicator, 
1
Ni I  our negative equity indicator based on the self-
reported house value, 
2
Ni I  our alternative negative equity indicator based on the metro area house 
price index,  13 Pi Z our instrument for the annual property tax cost of moving due to Prop13 for 
California residents, and  FRMi Z our instrument for the annual interest rate cost associated with 
refinancing for households with a fixed-rate mortgage. 
We estimate this system using Roodman’s “cmp” program in STATA.  A description of 
the program, its implementation and applications is given in Roodman (2009).  For robustness, 
we also present results for a single-equation probit (used in FGT (2010)) and a standard linear 
probability model.
13 
                                                 
13 Schulhofer-Wohl (2011) correctly noted that our negative equity indicator was a dichotomous dummy and thus 
did not have the requisite properties for the IV Probit estimation procedure as carried out in FGT (2010).  
Consequently, our main results of this update are based on the IV Probit marginal effects from the joint estimation 
of the four equation system outlined just above.  For comparison, we also report estimates from a single equation IV 
Probit (used in our previous paper) as well as an IV linear probability version of the model, with those results being 
reported in the second and third columns of Table 4 below.  Schulholfer-Wohl (2011) does not instrument for the 16 
 
 
III.B. Negative Equity 
In this section, we first present updated results on the relationship between mobility and 
negative equity using new data from the 2009 AHS and for the five different mobility variables 
described above.  For the rest of our discussion, we code MOVE-SW
R for the full sample period 
from 1985 to 2007 or to 2009.  Table 3 begins by providing summary statistics on the 
distribution of self-reported negative equity by whether or not there was a move.  Table 4 then 
reports the results of re-estimating the core mobility specification from FGT (2010), using the 
five mobility measures described above as the dependent variable.  
The top panel of Table 4 reports marginal effects from that specification estimated with 
the cleaned and edited AHS data from 1985 to 2007.  Results for the expanded 1985-2009 AHS 
data are reported in the bottom panel. 
  Focusing first on the multi-equation probit marginal effects in column 1 indicates a 
statistically significant negative relationship between the presence of negative equity and 
mobility for our original MOVE indicator as well as for our improved MOVE1 indicator.  For 
our earlier sample period from 1985 to 2007, our preferred MOVE1 indicator implies that 
negative equity is associated with a two-year mobility rate that is 3 percentage points lower 
(ceteris paribus).  This is 30 percent of the baseline mobility rate of 10%, which is a similar to 
the relative impact than reported in FGT (2010).  The MOVE variable used in our earlier paper 
generates a slightly larger impact, but it is not statistically or economically different from that for 
MOVE1.  The more expansive definition of permanent mobility reflected in MOVE2 yields a 
slightly lower marginal effect of 2.8 percentage points, or about one-fourth of the baseline 
                                                                                                                                                             
measurement error.  As FGT (2010) showed, there never is any significant correlation between any financial friction 
and permanent moves unless attenuation bias is dealt with in some fashion. 17 
 
mobility rate.  It is different from zero at a ten percent confidence level for the 1985 to 2007 
sample, and we can never reject the null that the effects are the same across all three of these 
measures.  Comparing results across columns in the top panel indicates that implied marginal 
effects from the multi-equation Probit specification are consistently lower than for the single 
equation Probit and the linear probability specifications, although the pattern of findings is quite 
consistent.  In addition, the standard errors are such that we cannot conclude that the levels of the 
implied effects differ by estimation strategy. 
  The first column of the second panel adds in the data from the 2009 survey.  We find 
modestly lower marginal effects here as compared to the 1985 to 2007 results, and negative 
equity no longer is associated with statistically significantly lower mobility for the MOVE2 
variable.  However, these marginal effects are not significantly different from those from the 
earlier sample period, so there is no evidence yet that the most recent housing bust has materially 
changed the relationship between negative equity and owner mobility.  That said, one cannot and 
should not conclude that the relationship will not change over this cycle as more data becomes 
available, as cautioned in the original FGT (2010).  The previous section implies that it takes 4 to 
6 years for the vast majority of the censored housing transitions to be resolved.  Hence, it will be 
much later this decade before we can more confidently know how negative equity affected 
permanent mobility in this latest downturn. 
  Note that the coefficient on the MOVE-SW indicator as constructed by Schulhofer-Wohl 
(2011) suggests a positive correlation between negative equity and mobility.  In neither sample 
period is this statistically different from zero, but the point estimates are positive, not negative.  
The misclassification of so many temporary moves as permanent ones is likely to be critical here.  
Recall that theory does not suggest a negative correlation between temporary moves and 18 
 
negative equity.  Hence, it should not be surprising to find a weak and imprecise correlation 
when more than one-fifth of the coded moves may not involve a permanent move and sale of the 
home.
14 
  This intuition that the driving factor behind the difference in our negative equity results 
and those reported by Schulhofer-Wohl (2011) is the conflation of temporary and permanent 
moves is corroborated by comparing the different estimates associated with MOVE-SW and 
MOVE-SW
R.  Recall that the distinction between these two measures is that MOVE-SW
R retains 
moves as identified by Schulhofer-Wohl that are known ex post to be temporary, whereas 
MOVE-SW allows these temporary moves to be recoded as non-moves.  Retaining these 
temporary moves increases the measured mobility rate from 16.1% for MOVE-SW to 17.8% for 
MOVE-SW
R.  The estimates in Table 4 indicate that adding these additional temporary moves 
raises in each case the estimated positive impact of negative equity on mobility. 
  Of course, the underlying sample used in generating these estimates is the result of 
censoring all cases in which we cannot tell whether both physical location and economic 
ownership changed.  That is roughly half of the excess moves in MOVE-SW
R relative to 
MOVE2 based on our real time analysis of the 1985-1999 period.  Practically speaking, most of 
the censored cases in our full data set are from recent waves of the AHS, and Table 2’s results 
suggest that the vast majority will be resolved within four to six years.  However, it seems likely 
that at least some of the cases in which the previous owner is coded as no longer living in the 
                                                 
14 We also estimated all models with the original FHFA price series used to help determine negative equity.  
Focusing on the system IV Probit results, MOVE-SW remains positive but still statistically insignificant. MOVE 
continues to be positive and statistically significant. The marginal effects for MOVE1 and MOVE2 decline by 
around 25% for the 1985-2007 sample, and by around 40% for the 1985-2009 sample and are no longer statistically 
significant. This drop in the magnitude of the marginal effect likely reflects that inability of the FHFA house price 
indices to accurately track the declining house prices due to its narrow focus on houses financed with conforming 
mortgages.    19 
 
unit over multiple surveys, but for which there still is no clear evidence of a sale, actually are 
permanent moves.   
  This raises the question of whether we could improve on our permanent mobility measure 
MOVE2 to count as moves situations where it seems likely (but not certain) that a permanent 
move has taken place.  Intuition might suggest that the longer the ownership gap observed where 
the residence is reported as rental or vacant, the more likely that the previous owner will not 
return.  To check on this possibility, we looked at ownership gaps of different lengths and 
computed the fractions of cases that the move turned out to be temporary conditional on having 
the information to make this determination.  For situations where the residence has been rented 
or vacant for at least three surveys, the transition turned out to be temporary in 59% of the cases 
where we could determine the final outcome.  If we lengthen the ownership gap to four or more 
surveys the percentage of temporary moves actually increases to 62%.  This pattern continues for 
ownership gaps of five or more and of six or move surveys.  Thus, conditional on those cases 
where we can resolve the nature of the transition, the simple intuition that the longer the current 
ownership gap the more likely the move will turn out to be permanent is not supported in the 
data.  For this reason, we do not think that you can improve on MOVE2 by recoding censored 
transitions as moves given an ownership gap of some specified length.  However, it still is useful 
to understand that the potential fragility of our results (and, possibly, those who came before us) 
arises from the fact that it is difficult to properly measure mobility in a number of cases. 
 
III.B. Fixed Rate Mortgage and Property Tax Lock-Ins 
  Updated results on the impact of two additional financial frictions on household mobility 
are presented in Table 5.  The first friction pertains to homeowners with a fixed-rate mortgage 20 
 
(FRM). In a rising interest rate environment, if a homeowner with a FRM moves, the monthly 
cost of an identically sized mortgage can be higher.  The second friction pertains to homeowners 
in California whose property tax increases have been limited over time due to Proposition 13.  If 
the homeowner moves to a similarly valued property, then property taxes would be set to the 
fully assessed value of the house. In both cases, we examine the marginal effect of an additional 
$1,000 annual cost on the likelihood that the household moves.  We provide estimates for 
specifications containing our two improved mobility indicators for the expanded sample period 
where we use the FACL overall house prices to update home values.  The data confirm our 
earlier findings that both frictions give rise to reduced household mobility – from 10% to 16% 
lower per $1,000 using our preferred mobility measure MOVE1.  In none of the specifications do 
the data reject that the mobility friction is the same whether it is being generated by rising rates 
for a fixed rate borrower or higher property taxes for California homeowners.  
  We suspect that this interest rate-related lock-in effect will become increasingly 
important as monetary policy is normalized in the future.  To illustrate, consider the hypothetical 
case of a 250 basis point increase in the average 30-year fixed-rate mortgage interest rate as a 
result of the normalization of monetary policy.  For homeowners in 2009 with a FRM, this 
results in a mean (median) annual payment difference of $2,300 ($1,710).  Using the probit 
marginal effects for MOVE1, this implies a mean (median) reduction in the 2-year mobility rate 
of 3.7 (2.7) percentage points.  If we redo the calculation using the estimates for MOVE2, we get 
a reduction in the 2-year mobility rate of 5.3 (3.9) percentage points.  This suggests that as 21 
 
negative equity (hopefully) diminishes in importance over the coming years, it well may be 
offset by an increasing fixed-rate mortgage friction.
15 
 
III.C. Housing Frictions and Labor Markets 
  Finally, there has been increased interest in the degree to which any mobility frictions 
from the housing market may generate labor market frictions.  While we do not have space in 
this note to discuss in detail the recent literature on this question, the AHS data are useful in 
examining the types of moves that are likely to be impacted by housing market frictions.  The 
AHS asks recent movers (moved within the last 2 years) the primary reason for the move and, 
until 1995, the distance of the move.  A high percentage of moves – 73 percent – are local, while 
only 13 percent of moves cross a state border.  Table 6 provides more detail in its tabulation of 
the primary reason for moves, both overall and broken down by distance of the move.  Most 
moves are for quality-of-life, personal/family and financial reasons, and do not appear to be 
primarily job-related.  This is especially the case for local moves.  In contrast, longer distance 
moves, particularly those that cross a state border tend to be job-related.  One potential 
implication of these data is that financial frictions to household mobility are more likely to 
reduce local moves such as trade-up purchases that need not have any significant spillover 
effects for labor markets.  This view is consistent with recent work by Donovan and Schnure 
(2011) using American Community Survey data as well as by Aaronson and Davis (2011) using 
Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) data.
16 
                                                 
15 This is particularly true for borrowers who received a below market mortgage rate through a private modification 
or a HAMP modification (conditional on the borrower not re-defaulting on the modified mortgage). If these low rate 
mortgages were assumable, then there would be no associated mobility friction. 
16 Household panel data sets such as SIPP data have the advantage that they can follow a household across different 
residences. A challenge, though, is identifying permanent from temporary moves since this requires access to 
specific address information. 22 
 
 
IV.  Summary and Implications for Future Research 
Including the most recent AHS survey for 2009, which reflects the initial data from the 
recent housing bust, does not materially change previously reported estimates of how negative 
equity and other financial frictions are correlated with homeowner mobility.  Homeowners with 
negative equity remain about one-third less likely to move than otherwise observationally 
equivalent owners.  However, the uncertainty surrounding changes in economic ownership 
involving various transitions concentrated in the last few surveys suggests we cannot really know 
for sure how the recent housing bust impacted permanent mobility until a few years into the 
future when the data will reveal the true nature of those transitions.   
A critique of our sample selection procedures which claimed to reverse this result appears 
largely due to the incorrect classification of many transitions as moves that are likely to be 
temporary and not permanent, or simply reflect coding error in the individual surveys.  Whether 
negative equity can be positively associated with temporary moves is a question that we did not 
attempt to answer in our earlier work.  That said, our improved measure still does not reflect 
mobility perfectly because of our conservative policy of censoring transitions that cannot be 
definitively defined as permanent in nature.  Hopefully, others can develop better data sources or 
improved ways to reduce the noise in the AHS panels.   
  For the future, we think it as or more important for scholars to tackle the question of 
whether this correlation is causal in nature.  That will require new theoretical and empirical 
strategies to better control for labor market conditions.  As long as labor and housing markets 
move together (and there is sound reason both conceptually and empirically to believe they do), 
the correlation documented here could be driven predominantly by there being a lack of good job 23 
 
opportunities to which people would want to move.  Until we address this issue, we will not 
know the true social cost of highly leveraged home purchases that are more likely to lead to 
negative equity situations. 
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Table 1: Mobility Measures  
    
  1985 - 2007 
 %  Moved
1 Non-censored %  Censored 
MOVE 7.8  61,801  17.3 
MOVE-SW 16.4  68,206  8.8 
MOVE1  10.0 63,700 14.8 
MOVE2  11.0 64,450 13.8 
   
  1985 - 2009 
  % Moved  Non-censored  % Censored 
MOVE 7.5  66,280  17.7 
MOVE-SW 16.0  73,096  9.2 
MOVE1 9.7  68,371  15.1 
MOVE2  10.8 69,181 14.1 
1 The percentage moved is computed conditional on being in our final regression sample, which requires 
no missing data for all regressors pertaining to household and housing unit characteristics. Percent moved 
is the ratio of moves to the sum of moves and non-moves. Percent censored is the ratio of censored moves 





Table 2:  Permanent Vs. Temporary Moves 
 




 0  1 
MOVE2 
0 70,707  3,557 
1 0 8,550 
. (missing)  0  5,050 
 
% of False Positives Resolved Over Time 
  4 years or 1
st subsequent survey  66.0 
  6 years or 2
nd subsequent survey  17.4 
  8 years or 3
rd subsequent survey    7.7 
10 years or 4
th subsequent survey    4.7 
12 years or 5
th subsequent survey    1.9 
14 years or 6
th subsequent survey    1.2 
16+ years    1.1 
Note: 15.1% of false positives are resolved using vacancy status 




Table 3:  Cross-Tabs of Negative Equity and Mobility Indicators 
 
Mobility Indicator    Negative Equity 
No Yes 






































     












     
   MOVE-SW
R No 
  68.60 1.91 
 Yes 
  14.71 0.57 
 Censored 
  12.98 1.23 
 
Note:  American Housing Survey, 1985-2009. Negative equity is based on self-reported house values. 
MOVE-SW
R is the real-time calculation of MOVE-SW over the full sample period where we do not 









Table 4:  Empirical Estimates 
  
 1985-2007 
 IV  Probit   
(multi-equation) 
IV Probit  
(single equation) 
IV Linear  
Probability 

















































































































Notes: Probit marginal effects are average differences. Standard errors are given in parentheses. MOVE-
SW
R is the real-time version of MOVE-SW over the full sample period where we do not allow moves to 
be subsequently recoded as non-moves. 
** denotes statistical significance at the 95% confidence level.   
   * denotes statistical significance at the 90% confidence level.  28 
 
Table 5. Impact of Other Financial Frictions on Household Mobility 










Mobility indicator: MOVE1      
 








     
    Proposition 13 Property Tax 











Mobility indicator: MOVE2 
 
     
     Fixed-Rate Mortgage 








    Proposition 13 Property Tax 










Note: Probit marginal effects are average derivatives with standard errors given in parentheses. Sample: 
1985-2009 
** denotes statistical significance at the 95% confidence level. 




Table 6. Main Reason For Move: Overall and by distance of move 
 















Job Related  12.58  13.23    3.85  21.20  60.53  66.10 
Quality of Life  26.70  23.94  26.67  24.97    8.18    3.39 
Personal/Family  23.88  20.44  19.73  16.64  10.22    6.78 
Financial  21.83  25.55  33.00  20.55  4.25    6.78 
Other 11.84  13.18  12.90  13.13  14.94  15.25 
All Equal    3.17    3.67    3.85    3.51    1.89    1.69 
Note: American Housing Survey, authors’ calculations – sample restricted to owner-occupied respondents 
between 21 and 59 years of age. 
 